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Abstract—When collecting information, local differential pri-
vacy (LDP) alleviates privacy concerns of users because their
private information is randomized before being sent it to the
central aggregator. LDP imposes large amount of noise as each
user executes the randomization independently. To address this
issue, recent work introduced an intermediate server with the
assumption that this intermediate server does not collude with
the aggregator. Under this assumption, less noise can be added
to achieve the same privacy guarantee as LDP, thus improving
utility for the data collection task.
This paper investigates this multiple-party setting of LDP. We
analyze the system model and identify potential adversaries. We
then make two improvements: a new algorithm that achieves a
better privacy-utility tradeoff; and a novel protocol that provides
better protection against various attacks. Finally, we perform
experiments to compare different methods and demonstrate the
benefits of using our proposed method.
I. INTRODUCTION
To protect data privacy in the context of data publishing,
differential privacy (DP) [28] is proposed and widely accepted
as the standard of formal privacy guarantee. DP mechanisms
allow a server to collect users’ data, add noise to the aggregated
result, and publish the result. More recently, local differential
privacy (LDP) has been proposed [27]. LDP differs from DP
in that random noise is added by each user before the data
is sent to the central server. Thus, users do not need to trust
the server. This desirable feature of LDP has led to wider
deployment by industry [33], [1], [25], [55]. Meanwhile, DP
is still deployed in settings where the centralized server can be
trusted (e.g., the US Census Bureau deployed DP for the 2020
census [4]). However, removing the trusted central party comes
at the cost of utility. Since every user adds some independently
generated noise, the effect of noise adds up when aggregating
the result. As a result, while noise of scale (standard deviation)
Θ(1) suffices for DP, LDP has noise of scale Θ(
√
n) on the
aggregated result (n is the number of users). This gap is
fundamental for eliminating the trust in the centralized server,
and cannot be removed by algorithmic improvements [20].
Recently, researchers introduced settings where one can
achieve a middle ground between DP and LDP, in terms of
both privacy and utility. This is achieved by introducing an
additional party [21], [32], [9], [22]. The setting is called the
shuffler model. In this model, each user adds LDP noise to
data, encrypt it, and then send it to the new party called the
shuffler. The shuffler permutes the users’ reported data, and
then sends them to the server. Finally the server decrypts the
reports and obtains the result. In this process, the shuffler only
knows which report comes from which user, but does not know
the content. On the other hand, the server cannot link a user
to a report because the reports are shuffled. The role of the
shuffler is to break the linkage between the users and the
reports. Intuitively, this anonymity can provide some privacy
benefit. Therefore, users can add less noise while achieving
the same level of privacy.
In this paper, we study this new model from two perspec-
tives. First, we examine from the algorithmic aspect, and make
improvement to existing techniques. More specifically, in [9],
it is shown the essence of the privacy benefit comes from a
“noise” whose distribution is independent of the input value,
also called privacy blanket. While existing work leverages this,
it only works well when each user’s value is drawn from a
small domain. To obtain a similar privacy benefit when the
domain is large, we propose to use the local hashing idea
(also considered in the LDP setting [13], [54], [11], [5]).
That is, each user selects a random hash function, and uses
LDP to report the hashed result, together with the selected
hash function. By analyzing the utility and optimizing the
parameters with respect to the utility metric (mean squared
error), we present an algorithm that achieves accuracy orders
of magnitude better than existing method. We call it Shuffler-
Optimal Local Hash (SOLH).
We then work from the security aspect of the model. We
review the system setting of this model and identify two
types of attack that were overlooked: collusion attack and
data-poisoning attack. Specifically, as there are more parties
involved, there might exist collusions. While existing work as-
sumes non-collusion, we explicitly consider the consequences
of collusions among different parties and propose a protocol
Private Encrypted Oblivious Shuffle (PEOS) that is safer
under these colluding scenarios. The other attack considers the
setting where the additional party introduces calibrated noise
to bias the result or break the privacy protection. To overcome
this, our protocol PEOS takes advantage of cryptographic tools
to prevent the shufflers from adding arbitrary noise.
To summarize, we provide a systematic analysis of the
shuffler-based DP model. Our main contributions are:
• We improve the utility of the model and propose
SOLH.
• We design a protocol PEOS that provides better trust
guarantees.
• We provide implementation details and measure utility
and execution performance of PEOS on real datasets.
Results from our evaluation are encouraging.
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II. BACKGROUND
We assume each user possesses a value v from a finite,
discrete domain D , and the goal is to estimate frequency of
v ∈ D .
A. Differential Privacy
Differential privacy is a rigorous notion about individual’s
privacy in the setting where there is a trusted data curator, who
gathers data from individual users, processes the data in a way
that satisfies DP, and then publishes the results. Intuitively, the
DP notion requires that any single element in a dataset has
only a limited impact on the output.
Definition 1 (Differential Privacy). An algorithm A satisfies
(, δ)-DP, where , δ ≥ 0, if and only if for any neighboring
datasets D and D′, and any set R of possible outputs of A,
Pr [A(D) ∈ R] ≤ e Pr [A(D′) ∈ R] + δ
Denote a dataset as D = 〈v1, v2, . . . , vn〉, where each vi is
from some domain D . Two datasets D = 〈v1, v2, . . . , vn〉 and
D′ = 〈v′1, v′2, . . . , v′n〉 are said to be neighbors, or D ' D′,
iff there exists at most one i ∈ [n] = {1, . . . , n} such that
vi 6= v′i, and vj = v′j for any other j 6= i. When δ = 0, we
simplify the notation and call (, 0)-DP as -DP.
B. Local Differential Privacy
Compared to the centralized setting, the local version of DP
offers a stronger level of protection, because each user only
reports the noisy data rather than the true data. Each user’s
privacy is still protected even if the server is malicious.
Definition 2 (Local Differential Privacy). An algorithm A(·)
satisfies (, δ)-local differential privacy ((, δ)-LDP), where
, δ ≥ 0, if and only if for any pair of input values v, v′ ∈ D ,
and any set R of possible outputs of A, we have
Pr [A(v) ∈ R] ≤ e Pr [A(v′) ∈ R] + δ
Typically, δ = 0 in LDP (thus -LDP). We review the
perturbation-based LDP mechanisms that will be used in the
paper.
Generalized Randomized Response. The basic mechanism
in LDP is called randomized response [56]. It was introduced
for the binary case (i.e., D = {0, 1}), but can be easily
generalized. Here we describe the generalized version of
random response (GRR).
In GRR, each user with private value v ∈ D sends GRR(v)
to the server, where GRR(v) outputs the true value v with
probability p, and a randomly chosen v′ ∈ D where v′ 6= v
with probability 1− p. Denote the size of the domain as d =
|D |, we have
∀y∈D Pr [GRR(v) = y] =
{
p = e

e+d−1 , if y = v
q = 1e+d−1 , if y 6= v
(1)
This satisfies -LDP since pq = e
. To estimate the frequency
of f˜v for v ∈ D , one counts how many times v is reported,
denoted by
∑
i∈[n] 1{yi=v}, and then computes
f˜v =
1
n
∑
i∈[n]
1{yi=v} − q
p− q (2)
where 1{yi=v} is the indicator function that tells whether the
report of the i-th user yi equals v, and n is the total number
of users.
Local Hashing. When d is large, the p value in Equation (1)
becomes small, making the result inaccurate. To overcome this
issue, the local hashing idea [13] lets each user map v to
one bit, and then use GRR to perturb it. More formally, each
user reports 〈H,GRR(H(v))〉 to the server, where H is the
mapping (hashing) function randomly chosen from a universal
hash family. In this protocol, both the hashing step and the
randomization step result in information loss. Later, Wang et
al. [54] realized H does not necessarily hashes v to one bit. In
fact, the output domain size d′ of H is a tradeoff. The optimal
d′ is e + 1. And the method is called Optimized Local Hash
(OLH).
Similar to GRR, the result of OLH needs to be calibrated.
Let 〈Hi, yi〉 be the report from the i’th user. For each
value v ∈ D , to compute its frequency, one first computes∑
i∈[n] 1{Hi(v)=yi} = |{i | Hi(v) = yi}|, and then computes
f˜v =
1
n
∑
i∈[n]
1{Hi(v)=yi} − 1/d′
p− 1/d′ (3)
C. Cryptographic Primitives
We briefly review the cryptographic primitives that will
be used. Note that throughout this paper, we assume that the
cryptographic tools are secure.
Additive Homomorphic Encryption. In Additive Homo-
morphic Encryption (AHE) [48], one can apply an alge-
braic operation (denoted by ⊕, e.g., multiplication) to two
ciphertexts c1, c2, and get the ciphertext of the addition of
the corresponding plaintexts. More formally, there are two
functions, encrypt function Enc and decrypt function Dec.
Given two ciphertexts c1 = Enc(v1) and c2 = Enc(v2), we
have c1 ⊕ c2 = Enc(v1 + v2).
Additive Secret Sharing. In this technique, a user splits a
secret value v ∈ {0, . . . , d − 1} into r > 1 shares 〈si〉i∈[r],
where r − 1 of them are randomly selected, and the last one
is computed so that
∑
i si mod d = v. The shares are then
sent to r parties, so that each party only sees a random value,
and v cannot be recovered unless all the r parties collaborate.
Oblivious Shuffle. In order to prevent the shuffler from know-
ing the mapping between the input and the output, oblivious
shuffle introduces multiple shufflers. A natural method is to
connect the shufflers sequentially; and each shuffler applies a
random shuffle. Another way of achieving oblivious shuffle
is the resharing-based shuffle [18], [42] which utilizes secret
sharing. Suppose there are r shufflers. The users send their
values to shufflers using secret sharing. Define t = br/2c+ 1
as the number of “hiders”, and r−t as the number of “seekers”.
The resharing-based oblivious shuffle [42] proceeds like a
“hide and seek” game. In particular, there are
(
r
t
)
partitions
2
of the r auxiliary servers into hiders and seekers. For each
partition, the seekers each splits its vector of shares into t
parts and sends them to the t hiders, respectively. Then the
hiders accumulate the shares and shuffle their vectors using an
agreed permutation. The shuffled vectors are then split into r
shares and distributed to all of the r auxiliary servers. Note that
now only the t hiders know the permutation order. The process
proceeds for
(
r
t
)
rounds to ensure that none of the colluding
r− t auxiliary servers know about the final permutation order.
III. PROBLEM DEFINITION AND EXISTING TECHNIQUES
A. Problem Definition
Throughout the paper, we focus on the problem of his-
togram estimation, which is typically used for solving other
problems in the LDP setting. We assume there are n users;
each user i possesses a value vi ∈ D . The frequency of value
v ∈ D is represented by fv = 1n
∑
i∈[n] 1{vi=v}. The server’s
goal is to estimate the frequency for each v, denoted by f˜v .
The accuracy is measured by the mean squared error of the
estimation, i.e., 1|D|
∑
v∈D(fv − f˜v)2.
We consider the shuffler model, which is the middle ground
between DP and LDP. In particular, an auxiliary server called
the shuffler is introduced. Users need to trust that the auxiliary
server does not collude with the original server.
B. Privacy Amplification via Shuffling
The shuffling idea was originally proposed in Prochlo [17],
where a shuffler is inserted between the users and the server to
break the linkage between the report and the user identification.
The privacy benefit was investigated in [21], [32], [9]. It is
proven that when each user reports the private value using GRR
with l-LDP, applying shuffling ensures centralized (c, δ)-DP,
where c < l. Table I gives a summary of these results.
Among them, [9] provides the strongest result in the sense
that the c is the smallest, and the proof technique can be
applied to other LDP protocols.
Method Condition c
[32] l < 1/2
√
144 ln(1/δ) · 
2
l
n
[21]
√
192
n ln(4/δ) < c < 1, binary
√
32 ln(4/δ) · el+1n
[9]
√
14 ln(2/δ)d
n−1 < c ≤ 1
√
14 ln(2/δ) · el+d−1
(n−1)
TABLE I: Privacy amplification result comparison. Each row
corresponds to a method. The amplified c only differs in
constants. The circumstances under which the method can be
used are different.
Recent Results. Parallel to our work, [8], [36] propose
mechanisms other than GRR to improve utility in this model.
They both rely on the privacy blanket idea. The method in [8]
gives better utility as it does not depend on |D |. However, the
communication cost for each user is linear in |D |, which is
undesirable when |D | is large. Moreover, its accuracy is worse
than the method proposed in our paper. We will analytically
and empirically compare with [8].
IV. IMPROVING UTILITY OF THE SHUFFLER MODEL
We first review the intuition behind the privacy amplifica-
tion proof, which is called the “privacy blanket”. Then we
borrow the local hashing idea in LDP, and design a local
hashing method that optimizes accuracy in the shuffler setting.
A. Privacy Blanket
The technique used in [9] is called blanket decomposition.
The idea is to decompose the probability distribution of an
LDP report into two distributions, one dependent on the true
value and the other independently random; and this indepen-
dent distribution forms a “privacy blanket”. In particular, the
output distribution of GRR given in Equation (1) is decom-
posed into
∀y∈D Pr [GRR(v) = y] = (1− γ)Prv [y] + γ Pr [Uni(D) = y]
where Prv [y] is the distribution that depends on v, and Uni(D)
is uniformly random with Pr [Uni(D) = y] = 1/d. With
probability 1−γ, the output is dependent on the true input; and
with probability γ, the output is random. Given n users, the
n− 1 (except the victim’s) such random variables can be seen
as containing some uniform noise (i.e., the γ Pr [Uni(D) = y]
part). For each value v ∈ D , the noise follows Bin(n−1, γ/d).
Intuitively, this noise makes the output uncertain. The fol-
lowing theorem, which is derived from Theorem 3.1 of [9],
formalizes this fact.
Theorem 1 (Binomial Mechanism). Binomial mechanism adds
independent noise Bin(n, p) to each component of the his-
togram. It satisfies (c, δ)-DP where
c =
√
14 ln(2/δ)
np
In Theorem 1, the larger γ is, the better the privacy. Given
GRR, we can maximize γ by setting Prv [y] = 1{v=y}, which
gives us γ = del+d−1 . The binomial noise Bin(n−1, 1el+d−1 )
thus provides (
√
14 ln(2/δ) · el+d−1(n−1) , δ)-DP [9]. One limita-
tion of [9] is that as GRR is used, the accuracy downgrades
with domain size d.
B. Shuffler-Optimal Local Hash
In order to benefit from the shuffler model in the case when
the domain size d is large, the key is to derive a mechanism
whose utility does not degrade with d.
1) Unary Encoding for Shuffling: We first revisit the
unary-encoding-based methods, also known as the basic RAP-
POR [33], and show that this class of methods can enjoy the
benefit of the privacy blanket argument. In particular, in unary-
encoding, the value v is transformed into a vector B of size d,
where B[v] = 1 and the other locations of B are zeros (note
that this requires values of the domain D be indexed from 1 to
d). Then each bit b of B is perturbed to 1− b independently.
To satisfy LDP, the perturbation probability is set to 1
e/2+1
.
Note that we use /2 because for any two values v and v′,
their corresponding unary encodings differ by two bits. We can
apply the privacy blanket argument and prove that a l-LDP
unary-encoding method satisfies (c, δ)-DP after shuffling.
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Theorem 2. Given an l-LDP unary-encoding method, after
shuffling, the protocol is (c, δ)-DP, where
c = 2
√
14 ln(4/δ) · e
l/2 + 1
n− 1
Proof: For any two neighboring datasets D ' D′, w.l.o.g.,
we assume they differ in the n-th value, and vn = 1 in D,
vn = 2 in D′. By the independence of the bits, probabilities on
other locations are equivalent. Thus we only need to examine
the summation of bits for location 1 and 2. For each location,
there are n− 1 users, each reporting the bit with probability
∀y∈{0,1} Pr [B[j]→ y] = (1− γ)1{B[j]=y} + γ Pr [Uni(2) = y]
where we slight abuse the notation and use Uni(2) for
Uni({0, 1}). Given that the perturbation probability is
Pr [1→ 0] = Pr [0→ 1] = 1
el/2+1
= γ/2, we can cal-
culate that γ = 2
el/2+1
. After shuffling, the histogram of
n − 1 (except the victim’s) such random variables follows
Bin(n − 1, γ/2). As there are two locations, by Theorem 1,
we have c = 2
√
14 ln(4/δ) · el/2+1n−1 .
2) Local Hashing for Shuffling: While sending B when
d is large is fine for each user; with n users, receiving B’s
from the server side is less tolerable as it incurs O(d · n)
bandwidth. To reduce the communication cost, we propose a
hashing-based method, with a tradeoff between computation
and communication. From the server side, it requires more
computation cost than the unary-encoding based methods;
but the overall communication bandwidth is smaller. In what
follows, we prove the hashing-based method is private in the
shuffler model.
We remind the readers that in local hashing, each user
reports H and y = GRR(H(v)). The hash function H is
chosen randomly from a universal hash family and hashes v
from a domain of size d into another domain of size d′ ≤ d;
and GRR will report H(v) with probability e
l
el+d′−1 , and
any other value (from the domain of size d′) with probability
1
el+d′−1 (Equation (1)). In terms of blanket decomposition,
the user reports truthfully with probability 1− γ = el−1el+d′−1 ;
and if the user reports randomly, any value from [d′] can be
reported with equal probability. We call this method SOLH,
which stands for Shuffler-Optimal Local Hash.
Theorem 3. Given the l-LDP SOLH method, after shuffling,
the protocol is (c, δ)-DP, where
c =
√
14 ln(2/δ)(el + d′ − 1)
n− 1
The proof of this theorem is technically challenging and
is highly non-trivial. But due to the space limit, we leave the
full proof to the appendix and provide the high-level idea as
follows: We first assume that the server knows which users
other than the victim (user n) report truthfully (i.e., with
probability 1 − γ = el−1el+d′−1 ), and prove that the server
can delete these reports from the shuffled reports. For the
remaining reports, we then prove the probability ratio can be
simplified to ratio of two Binomial random variables. Finally,
we bound this ratio and obtain c and δ.
3) Utility Analysis: Now we analyze the utility of different
methods. We utilize the framework of Theorem 2 from [54]
to analyze the accuracy of estimating the frequency of each
value in the domain (i.e., Equations (2) and (3)). In particular,
we measure the expected squared error of the estimation f˜v ,
which equals variance, i.e.,∑
v∈D
E
[
(f˜v − fv)2
]
=
∑
v∈D
Var
[
f˜v
]
Fixing the local l, the variances are already summarized
in [54]; our analysis extends that into the shuffler setting. We
fix c and estimate variance for different methods.
Utility of Generalized Randomize Response. We first prove
the variance of GRR.
Proposition 4. Given c in the shuffler model, the variance of
using GRR is bounded by
2c(n−1)
14 ln(2/δ)
−1
n
(
2c(n−1)
14 ln(2/δ)
−d
)2 .
Proof: Given the domain size d and the LDP parameter
l, the variance is given in [54]. Here for completeness, we
present the full proof. We will omit these steps in the following
proofs. Denote p = e
l
el+d−1 , q =
1
el+d−1 , and yi is the report
of user i, we have
Var
[
f˜v
]
=Var
 1
n
∑
i∈[n]
1{v=yi} − q
p− q

=
1
n2
Var
∑
i∈[n]
1{v=yi}
p− q

=
∑
i∈[n] Var
[
1{v=yi}
]
n2 · (p− q)2
Here for each of the n users, if the true value is v (there are
nfv of them) we have Var
[
1{v=yi}
]
= p(1 − p); otherwise,
we have Var
[
1{v=yi}
]
= q(1−q) for the rest n(1−fv) users.
Together, we have
Var
[
f˜v
]
=
nfvp(1− p) + n(1− fv)q (1− q)
n2(p− q)2
=
q(1− q)
n(p− q)2 +
fv (1− p− q)
n(p− q)
Plugging in the value of p and q, and assuming fv is small on
average, then we have
Var
[
f˜v
]
≤ q(1− q)
n(p− q)2 =
el + d− 2
n(el − 1)2
From [9], we have el + d− 1 = 2c(n−1)14 ln(2/δ) . Thus the variance
becomes
2c(n−1)
14 ln(2/δ)
−1
n
(
2c(n−1)
14 ln(2/δ)
−d
)2 .
Utility of Unary Encoding (RAPPOR). Similarly, we can
prove the variance of unary encoding.
Proposition 5. Given c in the shuffler model, the vari-
ance of using unary encoding (RAPPOR) is bounded by
2c(n−1)
56 ln(4/δ)
−1
n
(
2c(n−1)
56 ln(4/δ)
−2
)2 .
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Proof: According to [54], the variance of RAPPOR given
l is
el/2
n(el/2 − 1)2
From Theorem 2, we have el/2 + 1 = 
2
c(n−1)
56 ln(4/δ) . Thus the
variance becomes
2c(n−1)
56 ln(4/δ)
−1
n
(
2c(n−1)
56 ln(4/δ)
−2
)2 .
Utility of Local Hashing. Now we prove the variance of
SOLH and instantiate d′.
Proposition 6. Given c in the shuffler model, the variance of
using SOLH is bounded by
(
2c(n−1)
14 ln(2/δ)
)2
n
(
2c(n−1)
14 ln(2/δ)
−d′
)2
(d′−1)
.
Proof: According to Equation (10) of [54], the variance
of local hashing given l is
(el + d′ − 1)2
n(el − 1)2(d′ − 1) (4)
From Theorem 3, we have el + d′ − 1 = 2c(n−1)14 ln(2/δ) . Thus the
variance becomes
(
2c(n−1)
14 ln(2/δ)
)2
n
(
2c(n−1)
14 ln(2/δ)
−d′
)2
(d′−1)
.
Optimizing Local Hashing. Note that d′ is unspecified. We
can tune d′ to optimize variance given a fixed c. Denote m as
2c(n−1)
14 ln(2/δ) , our goal is to choose d
′ that minimize this variance
Var(m, d′) = m
2
n(m−d′)2(d′−1) . By making its partial derivative
to 0, we can obtain that when
d′ =
m+ 2
3
=
2c(n− 1)
42 ln(2/δ)
+
2
3
(5)
the variance is minimized. Note that d′ can only be an integer.
In the actual implementation, we choose d′ to be b(m+2)/3c.
Thus the variance is optimized to Var(m, b(m+ 2)/3c).
Comparison of the Methods. We first observe that the vari-
ance of GRR grows with d (as shown in Proposition 4). When
d is large, we should use unary encoding or local hashing.
Between the two, the variance of unary encoding is slightly
better, however, its communication cost is higher. Thus, be-
tween GRR and SOLH, we can choose the one with better
utility by comparing Proposition 4 and Var(m, b(m+ 2)/3c).
4) Comparison with Parallel Work: Parallel to our work,
[8], [36] also propose mechanisms to improve utility in this
model. Among them [8] gives better utility which does not
depend on |D |. Similar to our method, its proof also utilizes
Theorem 1. But the approach is different. In particular, [8]
first transforms the data using one-hot encoding, then inde-
pendently increment values in each location with probability
p = 1 − 2002cn ln(4/δ). We call this method AUE for appended
unary encoding. As each location is essentially a Bernoulli
bit, its variance is p(1− p) = 2002cn ln(4/δ)
(
1− 2002cn ln(4/δ)
)
.
Compared with Lemma 6, this gives comparable results (dif-
fering by only a constant). But this protocol itself is not LDP.
Moreover, as one-hot encoding is used, the communication
cost for each user is linear in |D |, which is even worse than
GRR. We will empirically compare with [8] in the experimental
evaluation section.
More recently, [31] also proposed a similar unary-
encoding-based method. We note that [31] operate on a
novel removal LDP notion. More specifically, previous (ours
included) LDP and shuffler-based LDP literature works with
Definition 2, which ensures that for each user, if his/her value
changes, the report distribution is similar. [31] introduces a
novel removal LDP notion inspired by the removal DP. In
particular, removal DP states that for any two datasets D and
D−, where D− is obtained by removing any one record from
D, the output distributions are similar. Extending that idea
to the local setting, removal LDP states that for each user,
whether his/her value is empty or not, the report distribution
is similar. Given that, a unary-encoding-based method similar
to RAPPOR [33] is proposed. The method is similar to the
method we described in Section IV-B1, except that privacy
budget l is not divided by 2. Interestingly, any -Removal LDP
algorithm is also a 2-Replacement LDP algorithm, because
Pr [A(v) ∈ R] ≤ ePr [A(⊥) ∈ R] ≤ e2Pr [A(v′) ∈ R]
where ⊥ is a special “empty” input. As a result, in our LDP
setting, the two methods achieves the same utility.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
This section focuses on the analyzing the security impli-
cations of the shuffler model. We identify different parties
and potential attacks. Then we propose countermeasures using
secret sharing and oblivious shuffle in next section.
A. Parties and Attackers
There are three types of parties in the shuffler model: users,
the server, and the auxiliary servers (shufflers). The auxiliary
servers do not exist in the traditional models of DP and LDP;
and in DP, the server may share result with some external
parties. Figure 1 provides an overview of the system model.
The Attackers. From the point of view of a single user, other
parties, including the auxiliary server, the server, and other
users, could all be adversaries. We assume all parties have
the same level of background knowledge, i.e., all other users’
information except the victim’s. This assumption essentially
enables us to argue DP-like guarantee for each party.
The prominent adversary is the server. Other parties can
also be adversaries but are not the focus because they have
less information. For example, in the shuffler-based approach,
there is only one auxiliary server. It knows nothing from the
ciphertext.
Additional Threat of Collusion. We note that in the multi-
party setting, one needs to consider the consequences when
different parties collude. In general, there are many combina-
tions of colluding parties. And understanding these scenarios
enables us to better analyze and compare different approaches.
In particular, the server can collude with the auxiliary
servers. If all the auxiliary servers are compromised, the
model is reduced to that for LDP. Additionally, the server
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Server
Auxiliary 
Server 1
User n
…
User 1
Auxiliary  
Server r
…
Fig. 1: Overview of parties and interactions. Users communi-
cate with the auxiliary servers. The auxiliary servers processes
the users’ data, and communicate with the server.
can also collude with other users (except the victim), but in
this case the model is still LDP. On the other hand, if the
server only colludes with other users, it is less clear how
the privacy guarantee will downgrade. Other combinations
are possible but less severe. Specifically, there is no benefit
if the auxiliary servers collude with the users. We consider
all potential collusions and highlight three important (sets of)
adversaries:
• Adv: the server itself.
• Advu: the server colluding with other users.
• Adva: the server with the auxiliary servers.
B. Privacy Guarantees of Existing Methods
Having identified the potential adversaries and the proving
technique, now we examine the shuffler-based DP. The key
ideas are (1) We model each attack’s view using an algorithm,
such that we can prove the DP guarantee. (2) We prove the
DP guarantee for each party separately. Existing work focuses
on Adv, but we examine the privacy guarantee against each of
the Adv’s. This gives a comprehensive understanding of the
system’s privacy guarantee.
In particular, existing work showed that if each user exe-
cutes an l-LDP protocol, the view of Adv is (c, δ)-DP. If the
users collude with the server, the server’s view is composed of
two parts: the shuffled reports as in Adv, and all users’ reports
except the victim’s. By subtracting each user’s reports from the
shuffled result, the server now knows the victim’s LDP report;
thus the model falls back to the original setting. Finally, if the
shuffler colludes with the server, the model also degrade to the
LDP setting.
Note that we assume the cryptographic primitives are safe
(i.e., the adversaries are computationally bounded and cannot
learn any information from the ciphertext) and there are no
side channels such as timing information. In some cases, the
whole procedure can be interactive, i.e., some part of the
observation may depend on what the party sends out. For
this, one can utilize composition theorems to prove the DP
guarantee. Moreover, the parties are assumed to follow the
protocol in the privacy proofs. If the parties deviate from the
prescribed procedure, we examine the possible deviations and
their influences in the next subsection.
C. Robustness to Malicious Parties
There could be multiple reasons for each party to be
malicious to (1) interrupt the data collection process, (2) infer
more sensitive information from the users, and (3) degrade the
utility (estimation accuracy) of the server. In what follows, for
each of the reasons, we analyze the consequence and potential
mitigation of different parties. Note that the server will not
deviate from the protocol as it is the initiator, unless to infer
more information of the users.
First, any party can try to interrupt the process; but it is
easy to mitigate. If a user blocks the protocol, his report can
be ignored. If the auxiliary server denies the service, the server
can find another auxiliary server and redo the protocol. Note
that in this case, users need to remember their report to avoid
averaging attacks.
Second, it is possible that the auxiliary server deviates from
the protocol (e.g., by not shuffling LDP reports), thus the server
has access to the raw LDP reports. In these cases, the server
can learn more information, but the auxiliary server does not
have benefits except saving some computational power. And
if the auxiliary server colludes with the server, they can learn
more information without any deviation. Thus we assume the
auxiliary server will not deviate in order to infer sensitive
information. For the server, as it only sees and evaluates the
final reports; and the reports are protected by LDP, there is
nothing the server can do to obtain more information from the
users.
Third, we note that any party can degrade the utility.
Any party other than the server has the incentive to do this.
For example, when the server is interested in learning the
popularity of websites, different parties can deviate to promote
some targeted website. This is also called the data poisoning
attack. To do this, the most straight-forward way is to generate
many fake users, and let them join the data collection process.
This kind of Sybil attack is hard to defend against without
some kind of authentication, which is orthogonal to the focus
of this paper. Each user can change the original value or
register fake accounts; and this cannot be avoided. But any
ability beyond it is undesirable. In addition, the protocol should
restrict the impact of the auxiliary server on the result.
To summarize, different parties can deviate from the pro-
tocol, but we argue that in most cases, a reasonable party has
no incentive to do this, other than poisoning the result. We
are mainly concerned about the users or the auxiliary server
disrupting utility.
D. Discussion and Key Observations
In this section, we first systematically analyze the setting
of the shuffler-based DP model. In addition to the adversary of
the server, we highlight two more sets of adversaries. We then
propose to analyze the privacy guarantee against different (sets
of) adversaries. Finally, we discuss the potential concern of
malicious parties. Several observations and lessons are worth
noting.
When Auxiliary Server Colludes: No Amplification. When
the server colludes with the auxiliary servers, the privacy
guarantee falls back to the original LDP model. When using
the shuffler model, we need to reduce the possibility of this
collusion, e.g., by introducing more auxiliary servers.
When Users Collude: Possibility Missed by Previous Liter-
ature. When proving privacy guarantees against the server,
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existing work assumes the adversary has access to users’
sensitive values but not the LDP output. While this is possible,
we note that if an adversary already obtains users’ sensitive
values, it may also have access to the users’ LDP reports. Such
cases include the users (except the victim) collude with the
server; or the server is controlling the users (except the victim).
Thus, the assumption in the shuffle-based amplification work
uncommon in real-world scenarios, which makes the privacy
guarantee less intuitive to argue.
When Parties Deviates: Avoid Utility Disruption. The
protocol should be designed so that each individual user or
auxiliary server has limited impact on the estimation result.
VI. DEFENDING AGAINST ATTACKS
We present a protocol that improves the security guarantee
of existing work. The goal is to simultaneously defend against
three threats: (1) the server colludes with the users; (2) the
server colludes with the auxiliary servers; (3) data poisoning
from each party.
A. Fake Response from Auxiliary Servers
To defend against the threat when the server colludes with
the users, we propose to have the auxiliary servers inject noise.
There can be different ways to do this. Our approach utilizes
uniform fake reports. The intuition of this approach is that (1)
its analysis is compatible with the privacy blanket argument,
which will be more clear later; and (2) the expected noise
for each value in the domain is the same, thus suitable for
obtaining a good privacy amplification effect. On the server
side, after obtaining the estimated frequency f˜ , the server
recovers the frequency for the original dataset by subtracting
the expected noise, i.e.,
f ′v =
n+ nr
n
f˜v − nr
n
1
d
(6)
Building on top of this, we present efforts to defend
against the other two threats, i.e., the server colluding with
the auxiliary servers, and data poisoning attack.
1) First Attempt: Sequential Shuffle: To improve the trust
model of the shuffler-based model, one idea is to introduce
a sequence of shufflers, so that as long as one shuffler is
trusted, the privacy guarantee remains. In this case, the task
of inserting nr fake reports can be divided equally among
the r auxiliary servers (shufflers). More specifically, the first
shuffler receives the users’ LDP reports as input, and draws
nu = nr/r fake reports. It then shuffles all the reports and
sends them to the second shuffler, who draws another nu fake
reports, shuffles all the reports, and sends them to the next
shuffler. This procedure proceeds until the last shuffler sends
the result to the server. Onion encryption is used during the
process; each party decrypts one layer of encryption, and the
server obtains n+ nr reports.
However, this approach is vulnerable to poison attacks by
the shufflers. That is, the auxiliary servers can replace the
users’ reports with any report of their choice to change the
final result, and the fake reports each shuffler inserts can be
chosen arbitrarily.
To mitigate the first threat, we can use an idea of spot-
checking. That is, the server can add dummy accounts before
the system setup, then it can check whether the reports from
his accounts are tampered. For the second threat, we find that
it hard to handle. Specifically, a dishonest auxiliary server may
draw fake reports from some skewed (instead of uniform)
distribution in order to mislead the analyzer and achieve a
desired result; and there is no way to self-prove the randomness
he used is truly random.
2) Second Attempt: Oblivious Shuffle: To overcome the
data poisoning attack, our approach is to construct the fake
reports using secret sharing, which ensures that as long as
one shuffler is honest, the inserted fake reports are uniformly
random. To share an LDP report, we note that for both GRR
and SOLH, the domain of the report can be mapped to an
ordinal group {0, 1, . . . , x}, where each index represents one
different LDP report. Thus the LDP reports can be treated as
numbers and shared with additive secret sharing.
In order to shuffle shares of secret, we utilize the oblivious
shuffle protocol described in Section II-C. More specifically,
the n users each splits his/her LDP reports into r shares among
the r shufflers. Each of the shufflers then uniformly draws one
share for each of the nr fake reports. Thus the shufflers each
has n+ nr shares; and the sums of the shares equal to the n
reports from users and nr report that are random. An oblivious
shuffle protocol is then executed among the shufflers to shuffle
the n+ nr shares of reports. Finally the r shufflers send their
shares to the server, who combines the shares to obtain the
results. Note that the communication is assumed to be done
via secure channels.
This solution suffers from a threat that, even without the
server, half of the shufflers can collude to recover the user
reports. To mitigate this concern, we design a new oblivious
shuffle protocol EOS that uses additive homomorphic encryp-
tion (AHE).
3) Proposal: Private Encrypted Oblivious Shuffle: To en-
sure that the shufflers cannot infer the users’ reported data,
a natural solution is to encrypt the shares using the server’s
public key. Moreover, the encryption needs to be additively
homomorphic in order to be compatible with the secret-
sharing operations. In what follows, we present a new pro-
tocol Encrypted Oblivious Shuffle (EOS) that utilizes addi-
tive homomorphic encryption (AHE) in oblivious shuffle. We
then present our proposal Private Encrypted Oblivious Shuffle
(shorted for PEOS) that uses EOS for DP.
Encrypted Oblivious Shuffle. Encrypted Oblivious Shuffle
(EOS) works similarly to oblivious shuffle. One difference is
that in each round, one shuffler will possess the encrypted
shares. The encrypted shares can be shuffled and randomized
just like normal shares except that they are then processed
under AHE.
Denote the shuffler who possess encrypted shares as E. In
each round, E splits its encrypted vector of shares into t new
vectors so that t−1 of which are plaintexts, and the last one is
still in the ciphertext form (this can be done because of AHE).
The t shares are randomly sent to the t hiders. Only one of
them will receive the ciphertext share and become the next E.
After the group shuffling, the new E splits its vector of shares
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Init Share Random Shuffle ReshareHide
Fig. 2: Overview of EOS with r = 3 shufflers and n = 3 values a, b, c. Each shuffler receives n shares; and one shuffler’s shares
are encrypted by additive homomorphic encryption. During hiding, one shuffler sends its shares to the other two shufflers, who
then shuffle the aggregated shares with an agreed permutation. To reshare, each of the shufflers splits its shares and send them
to the other shufflers.
and sends them to r parties. An example of EOS with r = 3
is demonstrated in Figure 2. EOS strengthens oblivious shuffle
in that even if the r shufflers collude, they cannot figure out
the users’ original reports, because one share is encrypted.
Note that there is a crucial requirement for the AHE
scheme: it should support a plaintext space of Z2` where `
is normally 32 or 64 in our case. This is because the fake
reports are sampled locally as random `-bit shares, and later
they will be encrypted and added in AHE form, so that the
decrypted result modulo 2` looks like other reports. Otherwise
the fakeness will be detected by the server. Such an AHE
scheme can be instantiated to be the full-decryption variant of
DGK [24] using Pohlig-Hellman algorithm [49].
Corollary 7. Encrypted oblivious shuffle, instantiated with
additive homomorphic encryption of plaintext space Z2` , is
a secure oblivious shuffle protocol in the semi-honest model.
Proof Sketch: The difference of EOS from oblivious shuffle
is that AHE is used for one hider’s computation in each round.
As long as AHE does not leak additional information, similar
proof about the final shuffling order can be derived from
oblivious shuffle [42].
For AHE, note that although we use AHE for one hider’s
computation in each round, the computation is translated into
modulo 2` in the plaintext space, which is exactly the same as
normal secret sharing computation. Therefore, AHE does not
leak additional information as long as the security assumption
of the AHE holds (hardness of integer factorization in the
case of DGK).
Using EOS for Differential Privacy. To use EOS for DP,
each user encrypts one share (w.l.o.g., the rth share) using
the server’s public key pks before uploading. In addition, we
have the shufflers add fake reports. The full description of this
protocol is given in Algorithm 1. There are three kinds of
parties, users, shufflers, and the server. They all agree to use
some method FO with the same parameter (e.g., , domain size,
etc); the FO can be either GRR or SOLH, depending on the
utility, as described in Section IV-B3. All the communication
is done through a secure channel. The users split their LDP
reports into r shares, encrypt only the r-th shares using AHE,
and send them to the shufflers. Each shuffler generate nr shares
for fake reports; only the r-th shuffler encrypt the shares with
AHE. In this case, a malicious shuffler can draw its shares from
Algorithm 1 PEOS
User i: Value vi
1: Yi = FO(vi) . FO can be GRR or SOLH
2: Split Yi into r shares 〈Yi,j〉j∈[r]
3: for j ∈ [r − 1] do
4: Send Yi,j to auxiliary server j
5: Send ci,r ← Encpk(Yi,r) to auxiliary server r
Shuffler j ∈ [r − 1]: Shares 〈Yi,j〉i∈[n]
1: for k ∈ [nr] do . Generate shares of fake reports
2: Sample Y ′k,j uniformly from output space of FO
3: Participate in EOS with 〈Yi,j〉i∈[n] and 〈Y ′k,j〉k∈[nr] and
send the shuffled result to the server
Shuffler r: Encrypted shares 〈ci,r〉i∈[n]
1: for k ∈ [nr] do . Encrypted shares of fake reports
2: Sample Y ′k,r uniformly from output space of FO
3: c′k,r ← Encpk(Y ′k,r)
4: Participate in EOS with 〈ci,r〉i∈[n] and 〈c′k,r〉k∈[nr] and
send the shuffled result to the server
Server: Shares from auxiliary servers
1: Decrypt and aggregate the shares to recover Y
2: For any v ∈ D , estimate f ′v using Y and Equation (6)
a biased distribution; but those shares will then be “masked” by
other honest shufflers’ random shares and become uniformly
random. By Corollary 7, the users’ reports are protected from
the shufflers; and the server cannot learn the permutation unless
he can corrupt more than half of the auxiliary servers.
B. Privacy Analysis
Now we analyze the privacy guarantee of PEOS. Because
of the usage EOS protocol, the server knows all the fake reports
and each user’s LDP report if it can corrupt more than br/2c
of the shufflers. And in this case, each user’s privacy is only
protected by l-DP. On the other hand, as long as the server
cannot corrupt more than br/2c shufflers, the server cannot
gain useful information.
In what follows, we assume the server cannot corrupt more
than br/2c shufflers and examine the privacy guarantee of
PEOS. The focus is on how the privacy guarantees change after
the addition of nr fake reports. With these injected reports,
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what the server can observe is the reports from both users
and the shufflers. If the users collude, the server can subtract
all other users’ contribution and the privacy comes from the
fake reports. The following corollaries give the precise privacy
guarantee:
Corollary 8. If SOLH is used and SOLH is l-LDP, then PEOS
is c-DP against the server; and if other users collude with
the server, the protocol is s-DP, where
s =
√
14 ln(2/δ) · d
′
nr
c =
√
14 ln(2/δ)/
(
n− 1
el + d′ − 1 +
nr
d′
)
(7)
Proof: The proof is similar to the setting of with SOLH,
but with nr more random reports. More specifically, when
other users collude, privacy is provided by the nr random
reports that are always random, and follow uniform distribution
over [d′]. Plugging the argument into Equation (10), these
can be viewed as a random variable that follows Binomial
distribution with Bin
(
nr,
1
d′
)
. The rest of the proof follows
from that for Theorem 3.
Similarly, for the privacy guarantee against the server, there
are n − 1 random reports from users, and nr reports from
the auxiliary server. The effect of both can be viewed as
one Binomial random variable: Bin (n− 1, 1/(el + d′ − 1))+
Bin (nr, 1/d
′) = Bin
(
n− 1 + nr, (n−1)/(e
l+d′−1)+nr/d′
n−1+nr
)
.
One can also use GRR in PEOS, and we have a similar
theorem:
Corollary 9. If GRR is used and GRR is l-LDP, then PEOS
is c-DP against the server; and if other users collude with
the server, the protocol is s-DP, where
s =
√
14 ln(2/δ) · d
nr
c =
√
14 ln(2/δ)/
(
n− 1
el + d− 1 +
nr
d
)
The proof is similar to that for Corollary 8 and is thus
omitted.
C. Utility Analysis
In Section IV-B3, we analyze the accuracy performance
of different methods under the basic shuffling setting. In this
section, we further analyze the utility of these methods in
PEOS. The difference mainly comes from the fact that nr
dummy reports are inserted, and the server runs a further step
(i.e., Equation (6)) to post-process the results. In what follows,
we first show that Equation (6) gives an unbiased estimation;
based on that, we then provide a general form of estimation
accuracy.
We first show f ′v is an unbiased estimation of fv , where
fv =
1
n
∑
i∈[n] 1{vi=v}.
Lemma 10. The server’s estimation f ′v from Equation (6) is
an unbiased estimation of fv , i.e.,
E
[
f˜v
]
= fv
Proof:
E [ f ′v ] =E
[
n+ nr
n
f˜v − nr
n
1
d
]
=
n+ nr
n
E
[
f˜v
]
− nr
n
1
d
(8)
Here f˜v is the estimated frequency of value v given the n+nr
reports; among them, n of them are from the true users, and
nr are from the randomly sampled values. For the n reports
from users, nfv of them have original value v; and for the nr
reports, in expectation, nr/d of them have original value v.
After perturbation, we have
E
[
f˜v
]
=
nfv + nr/d
n+ nr
Putting it back to Equation (8), we have E
[
f˜v
]
= fv .
Given that, we prove the expected squared error of f ′v:
Var [f ′v] = Var
[
n+ nr
n
f˜v − nr
n
1
d
]
=
(n+ nr)
2
n2
Var
[
f˜v
]
Now plugging in the results of Var
[
f˜v
]
from Section IV-B3
(note that we use replace n with n+nr in the denominator as
there are n+nr total reports), we obtain the specific variance
of different methods after inserting nr dummy reports.
Corollary 8 gives both s and c. For s, d′ is fixed given
nr and δ; but we can vary d′ given c. In particular, we can
also derive the optimal value of d′ following the similar to the
analysis of Section IV-B3 (after Proposition 6):
Given c =
√
14 ln(2/δ)/
(
n−1
el+d′−1 +
nr
d′
)
, we have
el + d′ − 1 = n− 1
14 ln(2/δ)/2c − nr/d′
We denote it as m, and (to simplify the notations) use a
to represent 14 ln(2/δ)/2c and b to represent n − 1. By the
variance derived above, we have Var = m
2
(m−d)2(d−1)
n+nr
n2 .
Note that this formula is similar to the previous one in
Section IV-B3; but here m also depends on d′. Thus we need
to further simplify Var:
Var =
(n+ nr)
(
b
a−nr/d′
)2
n2
(
b
a−nr/d′ − d
)2
(d′ − 1)
=
(n+ nr)b
2
n2 (b− (a− nr/d)d′)2 (d′ − 1)
=
(n+ nr)b
2
n2a2 (d′ − (b+ nr)/a)2 (d′ − 1)
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To minimize Var, we want to maximize
(d′ − (b+ nr)/a)2 (d′ − 1). By making its partial derivative
to 0, we can obtain that when
d′ =
(b+ nr)/a+ 2
3
=
2c(n− 1− nr)
42 ln(2/δ)
+
2
3
the variance is minimized. Comparing to Equation (5), in-
troducing nr will reduce the optimal d′. We use the integer
component of d′ in the actual implementation.
D. Discussion and Guideline
PEOS strengthens the security aspect of the shuffler model
from three perspectives: First, it provides better privacy guar-
antee when users collude with the server, which is a common
assumption made in DP. Second, it makes the threat of the
server colluding with the shufflers more difficult. Third, it
limits the ability of data poisoning of the shufflers. We discuss
criteria for initiating PEOS.
Choosing Parameters. Given the desired privacy level
1, 2, 3 against the three adversaries Adv,Advu,Adva, re-
spectively. Also given the domain size d, number of users n,
and δ, we want to configure PEOS so that it provides c ≤ 1,
s ≤ 2, and l ≤ 3.
Local perturbation is necessary to satisfy 3-DP against
Adva. To achieve 2 when other users collude, noise from
auxiliary servers are also necessary. Given that, to satisfy c ≤
1, if we have to add more noise, we have two choices. That
is, the natural way is to add noisy reports from the auxiliary
server, but we can also lower l at the same time. As we have
the privacy and utility expressions, we can numerically search
the optimal configuration of nr and l. Finally, given l, we can
choose to use either GRR or SOLH by comparing Theorem 3
and Theorem 4.
VII. EVALUATION
The purpose of the evaluation is two-fold. First, we want to
measure the utility of SOLH, i.e., how much it improves over
exsiting work. Second, we want to measure the communication
and computation overhead of PEOS, to see whether the
technique is applicable in practice.
As a highlight, our PEOS can make estimations that has
absolute errors of < 0.01% in reasonable settings, improving
orders of magnitude over existing work. The overhead is small
and practical.
A. Experimental Setup
Datasets. We run experiments on three real datasets.
• IPUMS [52]: The US Census data for the year 1940.
We sample 1% of users, and use the city attribute (N/A
are discarded). This results in n = 602325 users and
d = 915 cities.
• Kosarak [2]: A dataset of 1 million click streams on
a Hungarian website that contains around one million
users with 42178 possible values. For each stream, one
item is randomly chosen.
• AOL [3]: The AOL dataset contains user queries on
AOL website during the first three months in 2006.
We assume each user reports one query (w.l.o.g.,
the first query), and limit them to be 6-byte long.
This results a dataset of around 0.5 million queries
including 0.12 million unique ones. It is used in the
succinct histogram case study in Section VII-C.
Competitors. We compare the following methods:
• OLH: The local hashing method with the optimal d′
in the LDP setting [54].
• Had: The Hadamard transform method used in [5]. It
can be seen as OLH with d′ = 2 (utility is worse than
OLH); but compared to OLH, its server-side evaluation
is faster.
• SH: The shuffler-based method for histogram estima-
tion [9].
• AUE: Method from [8]. It first transforms each user’s
value using one-hot encoding. Then the values (0 or
1) in each location is incremented w/p p = 1 −
200
2cn
ln(4/δ). Note that it is not an LDP protocol, and
its communication cost is O(d).
• RAP: The hashing-based idea described in Sec-
tion IV-B1. Its local side method is equivalent to RAP-
POR [33]. Similar to AUE, it has large communication
cost.
• RAPR: Method from [31]. Similar to AUE and RAP, it
transforms each user’s value using one-hot encoding.
The method works in the removal setting of DP. When
converting to the replacement definition, it has the
same utility as RAP.
• SOLH: The hashing-based idea introduced in Sec-
tion IV-B.
• PEOS: We focus on the perspective of the computation
and communication complexity in Section VII-D.
• SS: As a baseline, we also evaluate the complexity of
the sequential shuffling method presented in VI-A1;
we call it SS.
Implementation. The prototype was implemented using
Python 3.6 with fastecdsa 1.7.4, pycrypto 2.6.1, python-xxhash
1.3.0 and numpy 1.15.3 libraries. For SS, we generate a
random AES key to encrypted the message using AES-128-
CBC, and use the ElGamal encryption with elliptic curve
secp256r1 to encrypt the AES key. For the AHE in PEOS, we
use DGK [23] with 3072-bits ciphertext. All of the encryption
used satisfy 128-bit security.
Metrics. We use mean squared error (MSE) of the estimates
as metrics. For each value v, we compute its estimated fre-
quency f˜v and the ground truth fv , and calculate their squared
difference. Specifically, MSE = 1|D|
∑
v∈D(fv − f˜v)2.
Methodology. For each dataset and each method, we repeat
the experiment 100 times, with result mean and standard
deviation reported. The standard deviation is typically very
small, and barely noticeable in the figures. By default, we set
δ = 10−9.
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Fig. 3: Results of MSE varying c on the IPUMS dataset. Base
always outputs 1/d for each estimation. Lap stands for Laplace
mechanism for DP.
B. Frequency Estimation Comparison
We first show the utility performance of SOLH. We mainly
compare it against other methods in the shuffler model, in-
cluding SH, AUE, RAP, and RAPR. For comparison, we also
evaluate several kinds of baselines, including LDP methods
OLH and Had, centralized DP method Laplace mechanism
(Lap) that represents the lower bound, and a method Base that
always outputs a uniform distribution.
Figure 3 shows the utility comparison of the methods.
We vary the overall privacy guarantee c against the server
from 0.1 to 1, and plot MSE. First of all, there is no
privacy amplification for SH when c is below a threshold.
In particular, when c <
√
14 ln(2/δ)d
n−1 , l = c. We only show
results on the IPUMS dataset because for the Kosarak dataset,
d is too large so that SH cannot benefit from amplification.
When there is no amplification, the utility of SH is poor,
even worse than the random guess baseline method. Compared
to SH, our improved SOLH method can always enjoy the
privacy amplification advantage, and gets better utility result,
especially when c is small. The three unary-encoding-based
methods AUE, RAP, and RAPR are all performing similar
to SOLH. But the communication cost of them are higher.
The best-performing method is RAPR; but it works in the
removal-LDP setting. Because of this, its performance with
c is equivalent to RAP with 2c.
Moving to the LDP methods, OLH and Had perform very
similar (because in these settings, OLH mostly chooses d′ = 2
or 3, which makes it almost the same as Had), and are around
3 orders of magnitude worse than the shuffler-based methods.
For the central DP methods, we observe Lap outperforms the
shuffler-based methods by around 2 orders of magnitude.
Metric Method
c 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
d′ SOLH 45 177 397 705
Utility
SOLH 5.27e-8 1.30e-8 5.76e-9 3.24e-9
RAPR (d
′ = 10) 1.31e-7 1.17e-7 1.14e-7 1.13e-7
RAPR (d
′ = 100) 1.73e-7 1.55e-8 1.22e-8 1.22e-8
RAPR (d
′ = 1000) 1.02e-4 2.60e-5 4.02e-8 3.66e-9
RAPR 7.82e-9 1.92e-9 8.53e-10 4.78e-10
TABLE II: Comparison of SOLH and RAPR in Kosarak.
In Table II, we list the value of d′ of SOLH and the utility of
SOLH and RAPR for some c values. We also fix d′ in SOLH
and show how sub-optimal choice of d′ makes SOLH less
accurate. The original domain d is more than 40 thousand, thus
introducing a large communication cost compared to SOLH
(5KB vs 8B). The computation cost for the users is low for
both methods; but for the server, estimating frequency with
SOLH requires evaluating hash functions. We note that as this
takes place on server, some computational cost is tolerable,
especially the hashing evaluation nowadays is efficient. For
example, our machine can evaluate the hash function 1 million
times within 0.1 second on a single thread.
C. Succinct Histograms
In this section, we apply shuffle model to the problem
of succinct histogram (e.g., [14], [12]) as a case study. The
succinct histogram problem still outputs the frequency estima-
tion; but different from the ordinary frequency or histogram
estimation problem, which we focused on in the last section, it
handles the additional challenge of a much larger domain (e.g.,
domain size greater than 232). To deal with this challenge, [12]
proposes TreeHist. It assumes the domain to be composed of
fixed-length binary strings and constructs a binary prefix tree.
The root of the tree denotes the empty string. Each node has
two children that append the parent string by 0 and 1. For
example, the children of root are two prefixes 0∗ and 1∗, and
the grand children of root are 00∗, 01∗, 10∗, and 11∗. The leaf
nodes represent all possible strings in the domain.
To find the frequent strings, the algorithm traverses the
tree in a breadth-first-search style: It starts from the root and
checks whether the prefixes at its children are frequent enough.
If a prefix is frequent, its children will be checked in the
next round. For each round of checking, an LDP mechanism
(such as those listed in Section II-B) is used. Note that the
mechanism can group all nodes in the same layer into a new
domain (smaller than the original domain because many nodes
will be infrequent and ignored). Each user will check which
prefix matches the private value, and report it (or a dummy
value if there is no match). In this section, to demonstrate
the utility gain of the shuffler model, we use the methods
SH, SOLH, AUE, and RAP as the frequency estimator (i.e.,
the framework of TreeHist stays the same; but the frequency
estimator is changed).
In what follows, we empirically compare them to demon-
strate the applicability and benefit of the shuffler model.
Following the setting of [12], we consider the AOL dataset
assuming each user’s value is 48 bits. We run TreeHist in
6 rounds, each for 8 bits (1 character). We set the goal to
identify the the top 32 strings, and in each intermediate round,
we identify the top 32 prefixes. In the LDP setting, TreeHist
divides the users into 6 groups, as that gives better results. In
the shuffler case, a better approach is to avoid grouping users,
but rather dividing c and δc by 6 for each round.
Figure 4 shows the results. We can observe that the except
SH, the other shuffler-based methods outperforms the LDP
TreeHist (OLH and Had) . In addition to the capability of
reducing communication cost, another advantage of SOLH we
observe here is that SOLH enables non-interactive execution
of TreeHist (note that this is also one reason why the original
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Fig. 4: Comparison on the succinct histogram problem. The
target is to identify the top 32 most frequent values.
TreeHist algorithm uses the local hashing idea). In particular,
the users can encode all their prefixes and report together. The
server, after obtaining some frequent prefix, can directly test
the potential strings in the next round. On the other hand,
using the unary-encoding-based methods, users cannot directly
upload all their prefixes, because the size of a report can be up
to 248 bits. Instead, the server has to indicate which prefixes
are frequent to the users and then request the users to upload.
D. Performance Evaluation
We evaluate the computational and communication costs
of SS and PEOS, focusing on the overhead introduced by the
encryption and shuffling. We run the experiments on servers
running Linux kernel version 5.0 with Intel Xeon Silver 4108
CPU @ 1.80GHz and 128GB memory. We assume there are
r = 3 and r = 7 shufflers. The results are listed in Table III.
As both methods scales with n+nr, we fix n to be 1 million
and ignore nr.
Note that we the results are only for SOLH with report size
fixed at 64 bits. If we use RAP in this case, the communication
cost will increase proportional to the size of the domain d (by
d/64).
Metric
Method SS PEOS
r = 3 r = 7 r = 3 r = 7
User comp. (ms) 0.24 0.49 1.6 1.6
User comm. (Byte) 416 800 400 432
Aux. comp. (s) 49 50 0.2 0.7
Aux. comm. (MB) 224 416 429.8 3293.3
Server comp. (s) 49 49 65 65
Server comm. (MB) 128 128 392 408
TABLE III: Computation and communication overhead of SS
and PEOS for each user, each shuffler, and the server. We
assume n = 106 and r = 3 or 7.
User Overhead. Overall, the user-side computation and
communication overhead are small for both methods. The
computation only involves sampling, secret-sharing, and r
times of encryption operations. All of them are fast. Note that
in SS, as onion encryption is used, its overhead is larger and
grows linearly with respect to r. The communication cost for
each user is also very limited.
Shuffler Overhead. For each shuffler in SS, the computation
cost lies in n decryptions (for one layer), sampling nu random
reports (with necessary encryption), and then shuffling. Note
that the decryptions is done in parallel. In this implementation,
we use 32 threads for demonstration. With more resources, the
processing time can be shortened.
In SS, an ElGamal ciphertext is a tuple 〈P,C〉, P is a
point in the secp256r1 curve and thus can be represented by
256 × 2 bits; and C is a number in {0, 1}256. That is, we
need 96 bytes to store the encrypted AES key for each layer.
For SOLH, we let each user randomly select an 4-byte seed
as the random hash function. After padding, each message is
32 + 96(r + 1) bytes, where r is the number of layers used
for shufflers. One additional layer is used for the server. Given
n = 1 million users and r shufflers, there will be on average
1
r × n ×
∑r
k=1(32 + 96(k + 1)) = 672 MB data sent to the
three shufflers.
PEOS is made up of
(
r
br/2c+1
)
rounds of sorting. Since
a well-implemented sorting on 1 million elements takes only
several milliseconds, the computation cost of shuffling is minor
for the shufflers. In addition, our protocol require each shuffler
do
(
r
br/2c+1
)·n/r homomorphic additions during shuffling. As
Table III indicates, all of these cryptographic operations are
efficient. The cost is no more than one second with n = 1
million reports.
According to the analysis of oblivious shuffle from [42],
each shuffler’s communication cost is O(2r
√
rn). In addition,
our protocol sends n encrypted shares each round, which intro-
duces another communication cost of O(2rn/
√
r) by similar
analysis (multiplied with a larger constant factor because of the
3072-bit DGK ciphertexts). In experiments with 1 million users
and 3 shufflers, each shuffler needs to send 430 MB. In a more
expensive case with 7 shufflers, it becomes 3.3 GB. While the
communication cost is higher than that of SS, we note that the
cost is tolerable in our setting, as the data collection does not
happen frequently.
Server Overhead. For SS, the server computation overhead
is similar to that of the shufflers, as they all decrypt one
layer. The server’s communication cost (measured by amount
of data received) is lower though, as there is only one layer
of encryption on the data.
In PEOS, the server needs to collect data from all r
shufflers. As only one share is encrypted by DGK, the commu-
nication overhead is mostly composed of that part and grows
slowly with r. The computation overhead is also dominated
by decrypting the DGK ciphertexts.
VIII. RELATED WORK
Privacy Amplification by Shuffling. The shuffling idea was
originally proposed in Prochlo [17]. Later the formal proof was
given in [32], [21], [9]. Parallel to our work, [8], [35] propose
mechanisms to improve utility in this model. They both rely
on the privacy blanket idea [9]. More recently, [31] considered
an intriguing removal-based LDP definition and work in the
shuffler model. Besides estimating histograms, the problem of
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estimating the sum of numerical values are also extensively
investigated [36], [37], [10].
Crypto-aided Differential Privacy. Different from using
shufflers, researchers also proposed methods that utilize cryp-
tography to provide differential privacy guarantees, includ-
ing [34], [30], [45]. One notable highlight is [22], which
proposes Crypt. In this approach, users encrypt their values
using homomorphic encryption, and send them to the auxiliary
party via a secure channel. The auxiliary server tallies the
ciphertext and adds random noise in a way that satisfies
centralized DP, and sends the result to the server. The server
decrypts the aggregated ciphertext. More recently, researchers
in [51] introduce several security features including verification
and malice detection. This line of work does not require
LDP protection, thus differs from our approach. Moreover,
to handle the histogram estimation when |D | is larger, the
communication overhead is larger than that of ours.
Relaxed Definitions. Rather than introducing the shuffler,
another direction to boost the utility of LDP is to relax its
semantic meaning. In particular, Wang et al. propose to relax
the definition by taking into account the distance between the
true value and the perturbed value [53]. More formally, given
the true value, with high probability, it will be perturbed to a
nearby value (with some pre-defined distance function); and
with low probability, it will be changed to a value that is
far apart. A similar definition is proposed in [40], [38]. Both
usages are similar to the geo-indistinguishability notion in the
centralized setting [7]. In [47], the authors consider the setting
where some answers are sensitive while some not (there is also
a DP counterpart called One-sided DP [26]). The work [39] is
a more general definition that allows different values to have
different privcay level. Our work applied to the standard LDP
definition, and we conjecture that these definitions can also
benefit from introducing a shuffler without much effort.
There also exist relaxed models that seem incompatible
with the shuffler model, i.e., [15] considers the inferring
probability as the adversary’s power; and [55] utilizes the
linkage between each user’s sensitive and public attributes.
Distributed DP. In the distributed setting of DP, each data
owner (or proxy) has access to a (disjoint) subset of users. For
example, each patient’s information is possessed by a hospital.
The DP noise is added at the level of the intermediate data
owners (e.g., [44]). A special case (two-party computation)
is also considered [41], [50]. [43] studies the limitation of
two-party DP. In [29], a distributed noise generation protocol
was proposed to prevent some party from adding malicious
noise. The protocol is then improved by [19]. [46] lays the
theoretical foundation of the relationship among several kinds
of computational DP definitions.
We consider a different setting where the data are held by
each individual users, and there are two parties that collabora-
tively compute some aggregation information about the users.
DP by Trusted Hardware. In this approach, a trusted
hardware (e.g., SGX) is utilized to collect data, tally the data,
and add the noise within the protected hardware. The result
is then sent to the analyst. Google propose Prochlo [17] that
uses SGX. Note that the trusted hardware can be run by the
server. Thus [20] and [6] designed oblivious DP algorithms
to overcome the threat of side information (memory access
pattern may be related to the underlying data). These proposals
assume the trusted hardware is safe to use. However, using
trusted hardware has potential risks (e.g., [16]). This paper
considers the setting without trusted hardware.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we study the shuffler model of differential
privacy from two perspectives. First, we examine from the
algorithmic aspect, and make improvement to existing tech-
niques. Second, we work from the security aspect of the
model, and emphasize two types of attack, collusion attack
and data-poisoning attack; we then propose PEOS that is
safer under these attacks. Finally, we perform experiments to
compare different methods and demonstrate the advantage of
our proposed method.
In summary, we improve both the utility and the security
aspects of the shuffler model. For the problem of histogram
estimation, our proposed protocol is both more accurate and
more secure than existing work, with a reasonable com-
munication/computation overhead. We also demonstrate the
applicability of our results in the succinct histogram problem.
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APPENDIX
Proof: Denote A as the algorithm of SOLH in the shuffler
model. Let A(D) = [SOLH(vpi(1)), . . . ,SOLH(vpi(n))] be the
output on a dataset D, where pi is a random permutation from
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[n] to [n]. W.l.o.g., we assume D and D′ differ in the n-th
value, i.e., vn 6= v′n. We denote R as the output from A(D).
It is of the form [〈Hj , yj〉]j∈[n]. To prove A is (c, δ)-DP, it
suffices to show
PrR∼A(D)
[
Pr [A(D) = R]
Pr [A(D′) = R]
≥ ec
]
≤ δ
where the randomness is on coin tosses of all users’ LDP
mechanism and the shuffler’s random shuffle. We first consider
the algorithm A(D) that, besides R, also outputs two other
values T and RT , where T indicates the indices of the
first n − 1 users who report truthfully (i.e., with probability
1−γ = el−1el+d′−1 ), and RT denotes their chosen hash functions
and hashed results (RT = [〈Hˆi, yˆi〉]i∈T ). We prove that this
algorithm is (c, δ)-DP. Given that, by the post-processing
property of DP, if A(D) only outputs R (this can be seen
as a post-processing step that drops T,RT ), it is also (c, δ)-
DP. We assume user n also report truthfully. Notice that if user
n report randomly the two probabilities are the same and can
be canceled out.
We first examine Pr [A(D) = (R, T,RT )]:
Pr [A(D) = (R, T,RT )]
=
∑
pi
Pr [pi]Pr [A(D) = (R, T,RT ) | pi]
=
∑
pi
Pr [pi]

∏
i∈T
Pr
[
Hpi(i)
]
1{Hpi(i)=Hˆi∧ypi(i)=yˆi}︸ ︷︷ ︸
reports from users in T
· (9)
∏
i∈[n−1]\T
Pr
[
Hpi(i)
] 1
d′︸ ︷︷ ︸
reports from users in [n− 1] \ T
·Pr [Hpi(n)]1{Hpi(n)(vn)=ypi(n)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
report from user n

Pr [pi] denotes the probability a specific random permutation
is chosen (Pr [pi] = 1/n!), Pr
[
Hpi(i)
]
is the probability user
i chooses hash function Hpi(i) (assuming there are h possible
hash functions, Pr
[
Hpi(i)
]
= 1/h), and the summation is over
all permutation pi. However, only some pi ensures Hpi(i) = Hˆi
and ypi(i) = yˆi for i ∈ T . Such a pi always maps i ∈ T to
fixed locations (Hpi(i) = Hˆi and ypi(i) = yˆi). Denote P = {pi |
∀i ∈ T,Hpi(i) = Hˆi ∧ ypi(i) = yˆi}, we have
Pr [A(D) = (R, T,RT )]
Pr [A(D′) = (R, T,RT )]
=
c
∑
pi∈P 1{Hpi(n)(vn)=ypi(n)}
c
∑
pi∈P 1{Hpi(n)(v′n)=ypi(n)}
where c = Pr [pi] (
∏
i∈[n] Pr
[
Hpi(i)
]
)(
∏
i∈[n−1]\T
1
d′ ) is a
constant that does not depend on vn or v′n, and the denominator
is from Equation (9) with a similar analysis on D′.
In what follows, we prove
∑
pi∈P 1{Hpi(n)(vn)=ypi(n)} =
c′
∑
i∈[n]\T 1{Hˆi(vn)=yˆi} for some constant c′, where we use
Hˆi, yˆi to denote the report of user i. Define R−T as reports
from [n]\T . First we assume RT and R−T are non-overlapping
(there can be overlaps within RT or R−T ). In this case, any
pi ∈ P will ensure reports from T ([n] \ T , respectively)
are mapped within RT (R−T , respectively). For any index
i ∈ [n] \ T that n is mapped to, denote cT as the number
of possible mappings within RT , and c−T as the number
of mappings (random permutations) within R−T , there are
c′ = cT · c−T /(n− |T |) valid permutations from P .
For the case when RT and R−T are overlapping (this
is actually very unlikely as each report involves a randomly
chosen hash function from a potentially large hash family, e.g.,
we use 32 bits to denote the seed of the hash function in the
experiment), permutations that map some indices from T to the
overlapped reports are also valid. Denote cT ′ as the number of
such permutations. For i ∈ [n]\T , if Hˆi, yˆi does not appear in
RT , we have c′ = cT ′ · c−T /(n− |T |). If ∃j ∈ T , s.t., Hˆi, yˆi
= Hˆj , yˆj , n can also be mapped to j. Summing up all such
j’s, we also have c′ = cT ′ · c−T /(n− |T |) valid permutations.
Combining the two cases, we have:
Pr [A(D) = (R, T,RT )]
Pr [A(D′) = (R, T,RT )]
=
∑
i∈[n]\T 1{Hˆi(vn)=yˆi}∑
i∈[n]\T 1{Hˆi(v′n)=yˆi}
(10)
So far, we have proved that, fixing R, T and RT , the ratio
only depends on the numbers of reports that are random and
matches vn and v′n, respectively. The high level idea is to
show that knowing T and RT fixes the permutation on values
from T ; and any valid permutation only shuffles values from
[n]\T (informally, this can be thought of as the server removes
reports from T ). Now define
NR,T,RT =
∑
i∈[n]\T
(
1{Hˆi(vn)=yˆi}
)
and N ′R,T,RT =
∑
i∈[n]\T
(
1{Hˆi(v′n)=yˆi}
)
,
we want to prove
Pr(R,T,RT )∼A(D)
[
Pr [A(D) = (R, T,RT )]
Pr [A(D′) = (R, T,RT )]
≥ ec
]
(omit the (R, T,RT ) ∼ A(D) part to simplify notations)
=Pr
[
NR,T,RT
N ′R,T,RT
≥ ec
]
≤1− Pr
[
NR,T,RT ≤ θec/2 ∧N ′R,T,RT ≥ θe−c/2
]
≤Pr
[
NR,T,RT ≥ θec/2
]
+ Pr
[
N ′R,T,RT ≤ θe−c/2
]
≤ δ
where θ is some constant. For (R, T,RT ) generated from a
random run ofA(D), we can show NR,T,RT and N
′
R,T,RT
fol-
low Binomial distributions. In particular, as we assumed user n
always report truth, there must be Hn(vn) = yn; the remaining
n− 1 users will first decide whether to report truthfully (i.e.,
with probability (el −1)/(el +d′−1)), and if user i’s report
〈Hi, yi〉 is random, we have Pr [Hi(vn) = yi] = 1/d′. Each
user’s reporting process are thus modeled as two Bernoulli
processes. As a result, NR,T,RT follows the Binomial distri-
bution Bin(n−1, 1/(el +d′−1)) plus a constant 1. Similarly,
N ′R,T,RT ∼ Bin(n − 1, 1/(el + d′ − 1)) + 1{Hn(v′n)=yn} ≥
Bin(n−1, 1/(el+d′−1)). The rest of the proof follows that in
the later part of the proof of Theorem 3.1 from [9]. The high-
level idea is to use Chernoff bound to prove the two proba-
bilities Pr
[
Bin(n− 1, 1/(el + d′ − 1)) + 1 ≥ θec/2] as well
as Pr
[
Bin(n− 1, 1/(el + d′ − 1)) ≤ θe−c/2] are equal to or
smaller than δ/2 when θ = n−1el+d′−1 ≥ 14k ln(2/δ)(n−1)2c .
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